RICO Rights for ERISA Wrongs: Can Plaintiffs Find Relief Despite ERISA Preemption of State-Law Claims? by Ross, Alan R.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 75 Number 1 
1-1-2000 
RICO Rights for ERISA Wrongs: Can Plaintiffs Find Relief Despite 
ERISA Preemption of State-Law Claims? 
Alan R. Ross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Retirement Security Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan R. Ross, Notes and Comments, RICO Rights for ERISA Wrongs: Can Plaintiffs Find Relief Despite 
ERISA Preemption of State-Law Claims?, 75 Wash. L. Rev. 313 (2000). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol75/iss1/10 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 2000 by Washington Law Review Association
RICO RIGHTS FOR ERISA WRONGS: CAN PLAINTIFFS
FIND RELIEF DESPITE ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE-
LAW CLAIMS?
Alan R. Ross
Abstract: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state
laws that relate to employee benefit plans and allows only equitable relief for those who are
injured by decisions of ERISA plan administrators. Even though the interpretation of
ERISA's preemptive power has changed since 1974, ERISA still poses a significant challenge
to plaintiffs in actions for damages against plan administrators. This Comment suggests that
another federal law, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which
is explicitly not preempted by ERISA, may provide relief. The challenges that a plaintiff
bringing an action against plan administrators may face include proving the "pattern" element
of the RICO violation and overcoming the requirement that a civil plaintiff be "injured in his
business or property." This Comment posits that in a case where the plaintiff proves that the
denial of rightful benefits is an administrator's regular way of doing business, the "pattern"
element may be met. It also argues that the damage caused by a fraudulent denial of benefits
under an ERISA plan may well be an injury to the business or property of the participant and
concludes that the civil cause of action under RICO may be a mechanism for litigants to use
in obtaining a remedy when ERISA's remedies are insufficient
In late 1990, Rhonda Bast learned she had breast cancer! In 1991,
after conventional treatment had failed, her oncologist recommended that
she undergo an autologous bone marrow transplant procedure (ABMT)
and high-dose chemotherapy.' Prudential, the administrator of her
employer's self-funded health plan, refused to authorize the treatment on
the ground that it was an experimental procedure excluded by her
employer's plan.' Over the course of six months, Prudential insisted that
Ms. Bast had no right to the procedure and sent her multiple mailings to
that effect.4 After Ms. Bast's attorney advised Prudential of cases
requiring insurance companies to pay for the ABMT procedure,
Prudential agreed that the procedure was covered.5 By then it was too
late. The cancer had metastasized to Ms. Bast's brain, and she was
medically ineligible for the procedure.6 Ms. Bast died in January 1993. 7




5. See id at 1005-06.
6. See id at 1006.
7. See id.
Washington Law Review
Her estate, husband, and minor son sued Prudential alleging breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations
of the state consumer protection act, the state insurance code, and the
Employer Retirement Security Act (ERISA). The district court granted
Prudential's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that ERISA
preempted the state law claims and that ERISA itself provided no
remedy.9 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that
"[a]lthough this case presents a tragic set of facts, the district court
properly concluded that under existing law the Basts are left without a
remedy.""0
This Comment argues that plaintiffs such as the Basts may have a
cause of action that would survive summary judgment and afford them a
remedy. While ERISA preempts state laws and may itself provide
inadequate relief, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO) authorizes a civil cause of action that provides treble
damages and attorney's fees to those injured by racketeering activity."
Thus, a plaintiff may obtain money damages if improper denial of
medical coverage amounts to a RICO violation. Part I of this Comment
traces the history of the ERISA preemption doctrine in the courts,
examines the parallel history of the health care payment system in the
United States, and discusses attempts to expand patients' rights by
statute. Part II discusses the elements of a civil RICO cause of action.
Part III argues that ERISA preemption of state-law remedies offers
inadequate relief for damage caused by plan administrators and creates a
problem that demands a solution. Part III also argues that despite
obstacles to invoking civil RICO in the context of improper benefit
determinations, a plaintiff in the proper circumstances can allege a RICO
injury, avoid the preemptive powers of ERISA, and obtain relief. This
Comment concludes that ERISA fails to provide adequate relief to
injured plan participants and fails to deter improper benefit
determinations by ERISA plan administrators, but a civil RICO action
may effectively provide both.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. Id. at 1005.
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
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I. ERISA PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
ERISA makes the regulation of private employee benefit plans an
exclusively federal concern." Employee benefit plan administrators have
used the federal shield of ERISA to avoid liability to individual plan
participants and beneficiaries beyond the limited remedies provided by
ERISA itself.
A. The Purpose and Scope of ERISA
Congress passed ERISA in 1974.13 In so doing, Congress hoped to
encourage employers to offer benefits to their employees by reducing the
cost and complexity of compliance with divergent state laws by
providing a homogeneous national framework for the regulation of
private employee benefit plans. 4
As its title implies, ERISA serves the primary purpose of protecting
the "retirement income" or pensions of workers.' It mandates certain
reporting and disclosure, 6 participation," vesting," funding, 9  and
fiduciary20 requirements for pension plans maintained by most private
employers.2' However, ERISA also applies to private "welfare benefit
plans," including employer-sponsored plans providing health benefits to
workers and their families.' Plan sponsors' must put both pension and
12. See 29 U.S.C. § I144(a) (1994).
13. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
14. See Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and
Health Policy, 7 Am. J. Tax Pol'y 47,49 (1988).
15. The Act was the result of public concern over termination of pension benefits either through
the termination of older employees or because of the insolvency of the employer. See John H.
Langbein & Bruce A. Wolk, Pension and Employee Benefit Law 77 (1995); see also United States
Gen. Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Employer-Based Health Plans:
Issues, Trends, and Challenges Posed by ERISA 30 (1995) [hereinafter Employer-Based Health
Plans].
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (1994).
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994).
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (1994).
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (1994).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1994).
21. Government and church plans are exempted. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (1994).
22. The statute defines an employee "welfare benefit plan" as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which... was established or is maintained for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
315
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welfare plans in writing,24 issue summary plan descriptions to
participants," and meet federal reporting requirements.26 Any person
with discretionary authority or responsibility in administrating an ERISA
plan is a fiduciary under ERISA.28 The duty of an ERISA fiduciary is to
act exclusively in the best interest of the participants and their
beneficiaries.29 Unlike most participation and funding requirements that
apply only to pension plans,30 ERISA's fiduciary rules apply to pension
and welfare benefits alike.3
B. ERISA 's Enforcement Mechanisms Are Limited to Equitable
Remedies
ERISA provides a system of enforcement that allows private causes of
action for participants or beneficiaries to enjoin any breach of fiduciary
duty or to "obtain other appropriate equitable relief.' 32 Specifically, the
civil enforcement provisions of ERISA allow for actions to recover
benefits due under the plan,33 to recover on behalf of the plan for breach
otherwise.... medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness,
accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other
training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services."
29 U.S.C. § 1002(i) (1994).
23. The employer is the "plan sponsor" in a plan established by a single employer. See 29 U.S.C.
§ i002(16)(B) (1994).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 1i02(a)(1) (1994). However, the lack of a written instrument does not
necessarily mean that a plan is not covered by ERISA. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 15, at 483.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1) (1994).
26. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 15, at 508.
27. A "person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, joint venture, corporation, mutual
company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization, association, or employee
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9) (1994). Benefit plans, with certain limited exceptions, most
notably those that provide benefits exclusively through insurance contracts with insurance
companies qualified by the states, must hold their assets in trust. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103 (1994).
Therefore uninsured plans themselves are "persons" within the meaning of the statute.
28. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(iii) (1994).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).
30. See Langbein & Wolk, supra note 15, at 508.
31. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1994) (defining "plan" to include both); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1) (applying fiduciary rules to "plans").
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1994).
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of fiduciary duties,34 to enjoin violations of ERISA or an ERISA plan
itself, or to obtain "other appropriate equitable relief' for such breaches
and violations." In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,36
the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted "other equitable relief' to mean that
damages-extacontractual, compensatory, or punitive-are not
allowed.37 Because there was no evidence that Congress intended such a
remedy, the Court reversed the lower court's ruling that a beneficiary
could obtain such damages.3"
C. ERISA Preempts State Laws That "Relate to" ERISA Plans
To ensure that, as much as practicable, the regulation of private
employee benefit plans would be exclusively federal, Congress mandated
that ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate to" plans covered by
ERISA.39 The savings clause of ERISA explicitly exempts from
preemption state laws that regulate insurance, banking, and securities.4"
However, to prevent states from labeling ERISA plans as "insurers" for
the purpose of evading preemption, Congress specifically provided that
plans themselves could not be considered insurers.4' Insurance
companies commonly provide administrative services to employee
benefit plans, but in such situations they commonly provide no
insurance; rather, the plan itself bears the risk of loss and is said to be
self-funded or self-insured.42
The courts initially interpreted ERISA's preemptive power very
broadly. In the seminal case Shaw v. Delta Airlines,43 a unanimous U.S.
Supreme Court held that New York's Human Rights and Disability
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994) (allowing recovery only for plan); see also 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(2) (1994) (authorizing civil action).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
36. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
37. See id. at 144.
38. See id at 144-45.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994) (providing that no ERISA-covered plan "shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company
or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State
purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks trust companies, or
investment companies").
42. See Fox & Schaffer, supra note 14, at 63.
43. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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Benefits Laws "related to" employee benefit plans and therefore could
not be enforced against ERISA plans." In interpreting ERISA's
preemption provision, the Court simply quoted the dictionary definition
of "relate," noted that the legislative history lacked any indication of a
more restrictive meaning, and held that a law "relates to" a plan "if it has
a connection with or reference to such a plan."45 Throughout the 1980s
and early 1990s, the Court stuck to Shaw's broad interpretation of the
"relates to" language of ERISA's preemption provision. 6
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,47 the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the insurance savings clause was similarly
broad.48 In Metropolitan Life, Massachusetts sought declaratory and
injunctive relief to require insurers covering Massachusetts residents
through insured ERISA plans to provide minimal mental-health benefits
as required by Massachusetts law.49 The insurers maintained that they
were exempt from the state-mandated benefit law since the law clearly
"related to" ERISA plans.50 The Court reasoned that because the
Massachusetts law would not frustrate the federal regulatory scheme-
ERISA did not mandate any particular benefits or benefit structure-and
because Congress had specifically exempted state insurance regulations
from preemption, the mandated benefit laws were not preempted.5'
The Metropolitan Life decision created a key distinction under ERISA
between benefit plans that purchase insurance contracts to provide
benefits and those that self-fund, with the employer maintaining the risk
44. Id. at 100. In Shaw, airlines and other employers sought a declaratory judgment that ERISA
preempted New York's Human Rights Law and Disability Benefits Law. See id. at 92. According to
the Court, New York could not enforce the provisions of its Human Rights Laws that were more
restrictive than federal civil rights laws against ERISA plans. See id. at 108. While ERISA allowed
states to regulate plans that are designed solely to comply with state worker's compensation,
unemployment compensation, or disability insurance laws, the Disability Benefits Law was
preempted to the extent that it attempted to regulate plans not solely designed for those purposes. See
id. at 108-09.
45. Id. at 96-98.
46. See, e.g., Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987) (holding preemption
"deliberately expansive"); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)
(according preemption "broad common-sense meaning"). For a comprehensive discussion of this
history, see Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 891-92 (Pa. 1998).
47. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
48. See id. at 746.
49. See id. at 734.
50. See id. at 735.
51. See id. at 746.
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of financial loss from larger-than-expected claims.52 States may
indirectly regulate the former through regulation of insurance contracts,
as long as they do not frustrate the federal enforcement scheme.53
However, states may not directly regulate ERISA plans themselves. 4
Because of this distinction, ERISA encourages employers to self-fund
their benefit plans and avoid even indirect state regulation.55
The likelihood that an employee is covered by a self-funded plan is
rising. Between 1989 and 1993, enrollment in self-funded health plans
increased by nearly six million participants. 6 Between 1993 and 1996
the percentage of employers sponsoring a self-funded traditional health
plan rose from nineteen percent to thirty percent.57 Among employers
with at least 500 employees, seventy percent offered self-funded plans in
1996."8 Because self-funded plans often act as insurance companies in
spreading risk and use insurance companies to administer benefits, it is
difficult for observers and participants to distinguish an insured plan
from a self-funded plan.59 The dichotomy between insured plans, which
are subject to state regulation, and self-funded plans, which are exempted
by ERISA, continues today.'
Even though the insurance savings clause was to be interpreted
broadly, in Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,61 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that state laws that conflict with the substantive provisions of
ERISA, though regulating insurance, were not saved from preemption.62
In Pilot Life, an employee brought common-law breach of contract and
tort causes of action for improper claims handling against the insurer that
issued the employer's group disability insurance policy.6 Speaking for a
52. For a discussion of the mechanics of self-funded versus insured plans, see Kenneth F. Wing et
al., The Law andAmerican Healthcare 83-87 (1998).
53. See Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 747 ("We are aware that our decision results in a
distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation while
the latter are not").
54. See id
55. See Employer-Based Health Plans, supra note 15, at 34.
56. See id at 15.
57. See Ken McDonnell et al., EBRIDatabook on Employee Benefits 237 (4th ed. 1997).
58. See i
59. See Employer- Based Health Plans, supra note 15, at 5.
60. See Andy Miller, Election '98 Health Care, Atlanta J. & Const., Oct. 11, 1998, at 7B.
61. 481 U.S.41 (1987).
62. See id at57.
63. See ia at 43.
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unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor reasoned that common-law breach
of contract and tort causes of action, though involving state laws for
purposes of the insurance savings clause,' are not saved from
preemption because they are not exclusively designed to regulate
insurance.65 The Court distinguished the mandated benefit laws at issue
in Metropolitan Life that operated exclusively on insurance contracts and
regulated in an area where ERISA was silent.' By contrast, the claims in
Pilot Life were based on general laws, the enforcement of which would
frustrate the clear intent of Congress that fiduciary standards for
employers and their agents in the context of ERISA plans be an
exclusively federal concern.67
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of ERISA's "relates to"
language came to an end in 1995 in New York State Conference of Blue
Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co. 8 The Court
admitted that the plain meaning of "relates to" is too broad and too vague
to be useful.69 In Travelers, insurers challenged New York statutes that
imposed a surcharge on hospital patients covered by commercial health
insurance but not on patients covered by Blue Cross and Blue Shield
plans.70 The courts below held that such statutes clearly "had a
connection to" the ERISA plans that purchased health insurance and
were thus preempted.7' However, because everything on some level
"relates to" or "has a connection with" everything else, the Supreme
Court examined the objectives of ERISA to determine whether the
particular state law at issue was preempted.7" This analysis forced the
Court to try to separate those claims that should be preempted because of
the closeness of their connection to ERISA plans and their impact on the
64. See id. at 48 n.1 ("For purposes of[29 U.S.C. § 1144], '[t]he term "State law" includes all
laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State.' 29
U.S.C. §§ 1144(c)(1) and (2).") (second alteration in original).
65. See id. at 57.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
69. See id at 655-56.
70. See id. at 651-52.
71. Id. at 651-54.
72. The unanimous Court reasoned that if "'relate to' were taken to extend to the furthest stretch
of its indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course." Id. at
655. The Court went on to point out that while "makes reference to" is a relatively straightforward
test, "has a connection with" is just as potentially limitless as "relates to." Id at 656.
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purposes of ERISA from those claims that were not so closely related or
had too tenuous an impact to require preemption. 3 The Court held that
the connection between the New York surcharge statutes and ERISA
plans was too remote to require preemption.74 The Court expressly
declined to overrule its prior ERISA preemption decisions but indicated
that the issue was no longer as clear as it had appeared prior to
Travelers.5
Since Travelers, courts have been more willing to find state laws not
preempted.7 6 The Travelers Court noted in dicta that "nothing in
[ERISA] indicates that Congress chose to displace general health care
regulation, which historically has been a matter of local concern. 77 As a
result, several courts have held that notwithstanding ERISA, medical
malpractice state claims can proceed.78
D. Health Care Payment Systems Have Changed
The health insurance industry has changed dramatically since the 1974
ERISA enactment.79 In the 1970s and 1980s, most health plans were
structured on a "fee for service" basis, rarely requiring authorization
prior to treatment.80 In response to rising costs, "managed care
organizations" (MCOs) grew in popularity.81 MCOs use various methods
to manage the cost of health care. 2 One common practice of MCOs is
prospective review of recommended or desired medical treatment to
73. See id, at 656.
74. See id at 668.
75. See id.
76. Of the three ERISA preemption cases decided in 1997 by the U.S. Supreme Court, two found
that the state laws in question were not preempted. See De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical & Clinical
Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., NA., Inc., 519 U.S. 316,319 (1997).
77. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.
78. See, eg., Pacificare of Okla., Inc. v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding
vicarious liability claim against HMO not preempted where claim did not involve administration of
benefits); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding malpractice not
preempted so as to permit removal to federal court).
79. See Wing et al., supra note 52, at 69.
80. See Jose L. Gonzalez, A Managed Care Organization's Medical Malpractice Liability for
Denial of Care: The Lost World, 35 Hous. L. Rev. 715, 723-24 (1998).
8 1. See Wing et al., supra note 52, at 83.
82. See id at 84.
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determine whether it is medically necessary, cost effective, and covered
under the terms of an ERISA plan.83
Combining the administration of benefits with the delivery of health
care services in one entity is a principal MCO technique designed to hold
down costs." In "integrated delivery systems," the entity that makes
benefit determinations, including what services are excluded under the
plan as experimental, also hires or contracts with the health care
providers who deliver services to participants. 5 Blurring the line
between benefit administration and delivery of care has allowed some
plaintiffs to characterize denial of benefits as medical malpractice.86
Some courts, based on Travelers, have agreed and refused to find ERISA
preemption.87 MCOs are especially vulnerable if they hire providers
directly, resulting in potential liability on the theory of respondeat
superior." However, where there is no such close relationship, most
courts have continued to draw a clear distinction between administration
and treatment and have dismissed state law causes of action that
implicate only benefit administration decisions.8
E. States Have Attempted to Expand Patients 'Rights
Many states have considered "patients' rights" legislation that would
allow patients to sue integrated delivery systems for money damages."
Texas was the first state to enact such legislation," and the Texas law92
83. See id.
84. See id. at 69.
85. The terms MCO and HMO are often used interchangeably, but the HMO model is just one
subset (although arguably the most extreme, directly controlling providers through financial
incentives) of the various popular MCO models that manage care through integration of the
financing and delivery of health care services. See id. at 83-84.
86. See Robert Pear, Series of Rulings Eases Constraints on Suing H.M.O. "s, N.Y. Times, Aug.
15, 1999, § 1, at 1.
87. See, e.g., Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 889, 894 (Pa. 1998) (holding claim against HMO for
administrative refusal to authorize transfer to particular hospital best characterized as medical
malpractice).
88. See Michael Higgins, Second Opinions on HMOs, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 60, 62.
89. See, e.g., Brandon v. Aetna Servs., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 110, 114 (D. Conn. 1999) (holding
that malpractice claim against plan administrator for refusing to approve treatment was preempted by
ERISA); Huss v. Green Spring Health Servs., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 400, 405-06 (D. Del. 1998)
(holding that claim of malpractice for plan's administrative error was preempted).
90. See Confidence in HMOs Sinks, But Congress Is Still Offering Placebos, USA Today, Sept.
24, 1999, at 17A.
91. See Charles Ornstein, Joining the Battle, Dallas Morning News, Apr. 12, 1999, at ID.
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has had mixed results in the courts.93 The law gives a patient the right to
sue HMOs and other managed-care entities for damages if the patient is
injured because of a health care treatment decision and the law mandates
an independent review process for adverse benefit determinations.94 In
Corporate Health Insurance, Inc. v. Texas Department of Insurance,95
the first challenge to the Texas law, the federal district court held that the
portion of the law mandating independent review of benefit deter-
minations was preempted to the extent that it applied to ERISA plans
because states cannot mandate a particular benefit structure for such
plans.96 On the other hand, the Corporate Health court upheld the
portions of the law that imposed health plan liability for improper
treatment decisions that affected the quality of benefits actually
received.97
Under Texas law, the portions of a statute that conflict with federal
law are severable from other provisions.9" The Corporate Health court
determined that the portions of the Texas law that mandated independent
review of benefit determinations could be severed." Consequently,
portions of the law that granted the right to sue health plans for poor-
quality care could still be given effect."° The court held that claims must
be reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the individual
claim addresses the quality of care and would be valid, or seeks review
of an adverse benefit determination and would be preempted.'' Thus the
explicit Texas statute yields the same result that the courts have already
begun to reach in the absence of state legislation: malpractice is
actionable, but denial of benefits by administrators is not.
92. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.001-.003 (West 1998).
93. See Charles Ornstein, Judge Upholds State Law That Lets Patients Sue over HMO Denials; But
Ruling Strikes Much oflndependent Review Process, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 19, 1998, at IA.
94. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 88.002-.003.
95. 12 F. Supp. 2d 597 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
96. See id. at 625.
97. See ie at 620.
98. See id. at 625-26.
99. See id at 628.
100. See id
101. See id at 629.
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F. Federal Patients 'Rights Legislation Has Stalled
At the federal level, the prospects of amending ERISA to allow state-
law causes of action are dim. The powerful business and insurance lobby
is firmly against such proposals, viewing them as the most threatening of
all patients' rights provisions.)° These proposals are unlikely to be
passed into law as long as the Republicans hold a majority in the House
and Senate. 3 Furthermore, patients' rights are seen as a second-tier
issue."° In the 1998 congressional elections, most Americans based their
voting on issues such as the economy, education, Social Security, and
taxes, ' 5 and a majority of candidates who advocated patients' rights
lost.0 6
Despite massive changes in our health care system and in society as a
whole since 1974, changes in the interpretation of ERISA's preemptive
power have been incremental. The states have tried to expand patients'
rights but lack the power to supersede a federal law that powerful
interests continue to support.
II. THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATIONS ACT
While ERISA does establish a comprehensive federal system covering
pensions and employee welfare benefits, plaintiffs may look to other
federal legislation for relief as well, because ERISA itself makes clear
that it does not preempt other federal laws.0 7 ERISA's broad preemption
of state tort and contract actions, and the lack of adequate remedies
within ERISA itself, make it difficult both to compensate victims of
benefit denials and to deter ERISA plan administrators from denying
legitimate benefits due under the plans. However, the Racketeer
102. See Alissa J. Rubin, Democrats Push Tough Health Care Standards, L.A. Times, Feb. 17,
1998, at A1.
103. See Immune from Suit, HMOs Crimp Fearlessly on Care, USA Today, July 15, 1998, at 10A.
104. See Daniel B. Moskowitz, Health Reform '99: A Modest Proposal, Bus. & Health, Dec. 1,
1998, at 19.
105. See Michael Pretzer, Will Congress Stop Playing Politics with Health Care?, Med. Econ.,
Jan. 11, 1999, at 83.
106. See id.
107. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d) (1994) ("Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the United States.").
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Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),08 another federal
statute, may provide plaintiffs with a surprising avenue to press claims
and secure relief.
A. Purpose and Scope of RICO
Congress passed RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970 with the declared purpose of eradicating organized crime. 9
Congress was concerned about the spread of organized crime into
legitimate businesses."0 Although RICO is primarily a criminal statute, it
includes a civil remedies provision"' that allows recovery of treble
damages and attorney's fees for private plaintiffs who are injured by
violations of the criminal provisions.'
B. Elements of a RICO Cause ofAction
RICO criminalizes four types of conduct: (1) using the proceeds of a
pattern of racketeering activity to invest in or acquire an enterprise,"'
(2) acquiring an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity," 4
(3) conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racket-
eering activity,"' or (4) conspiring to commit any of the first three
violations." 6 This Comment focuses on the third type of conduct, a so-
called § 1962(c) violation."7 To establish a violation of § 1962(c), the
following elements must be satisfied: (1) a person (2) conducted or
108. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
109. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922. Congress stated
that its purpose was "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening
the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged
in organized crime." 84 Stat. at 923.
110. See 84 Stat. at 923.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
114. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1994).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994).
116. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994).
117. Sections 1962(a) and (b) involve a racketeer "acquiring" an enterprise and do not implicate
the activities of an ongoing enterprise. The conspiracy section, § 1962(d), might be implicated as
well, but is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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participated in the affairs of an enterprise (3) through racketeering
activity that (4) formed a pattern. "8
Only "persons" may be sued under RICO." 9 RICO defines "person"
as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property."'20 As such, the defendant in a RICO action under
§ 1962(c) may be an individual or a business organization, provided they
are "employed by or associated with any enterprise... [and] participate,
directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity."'
12
A RICO "enterprise" includes "any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.' ' 122 This
definition encompasses legitimate business entities as well as purely
criminal ones." 3 To trigger federal jurisdiction, the enterprise must be
engaged in, or affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 21 The courts have
generally held that the person in violation of RICO and the enterprise
must be separate entities on the theory that one cannot "associate" with
oneself.'25
"Racketeering activity" refers to a broad list of predicate state and
federal offenses.'26 The list covers violent offenses such as murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, and robbery. 127 It also includes many
"white collar" criminal acts indictable under or involving federal laws,
such as bribery, extortion in credit transactions, embezzlement from
pension and welfare funds, money laundering, securities fraud, making
unlawful welfare fund payments, securities fraud, and mail and wire
fraud.'28 These predicates are made criminal elsewhere in state and
118. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
119. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1994) ("It shall be unlawfil for any person.. .
120. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1994).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
123. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 (1981).
124. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c). This requires a showing of the effect on commerce in each
RICO case, but the effect may be minimal. See Norman Abrams & Sara Sun Beale, Federal
Criminal Law and Its Enforcement 476-77 (2d ed. 1993).
125. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 124, at 477-78.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A).
128. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B)-(E).
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federal statutes. 29 RICO simply defines them as "racketeering activity"
and significantly heightens the penalties when they are committed in
such a way as to satisfy the RICO elements. 3
Finally, racketeering activity must form a "pattern" to be actionable.'
The statutory minimum requires at least two predicate acts within a ten-
year period.' However, in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone
Co., the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that two acts alone do not form a
pattern.'34 According to the Court, the facts establishing the pattern
element must pass a two-prong test: the "relatedness" prong requires that
the predicate acts be related to each other, and the "continuity" prong
requires that the acts amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal
activity. 3' Under this test, the predicate acts relate to each other if they
"'have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or
methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated events.""'3 6 Predicate acts occurring
over at least a one-year time period satisfy the continuity prong.'37 This
prong may also be established when the facts of the case demonstrate
that either the acts themselves include a specific threat of repetition or
that the predicate acts are an entity's "regular way of doing business."'
138
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
130. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 124, at 452.
131. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1994).
132. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
133. 492 U.S. 229 (1989Y.
134. See iL at 238-39.
135. Id. at 239-43.
136. Ma. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1994)). This definition may be as unhelpfully broad as
the construction of the "relates to" language of ERISA's preemption clause. See id. at 252 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
137. According to the Court, continuity may be proved by showing a series of related predicate
acts extending over a "substantial period of time." Id. at 242. Appellate courts have, at a minimum,
required one year to be "substantial.' See, e.g., Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., 974 F.2d 918,
922 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that seven to eight months is insufficient); Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc.
Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Comm., 953 F.2d 587, 593 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that six
months to one year is insufficient); Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 609-11
(3d Cir. 1991) (stating that "twelve months is not a substantial period of time"); American Eagle
Credit Corp. v. Gaskins, 920 F.2d 352, 354-55 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that six months is
insufficient); see also Primary Care Investors, Seven, Inc. v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208,
1215 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that between 10 and 11 months is insubstantial).
138. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. at 242-43.
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C. Mail Fraud as RICO's Predicate Offense
Mail fraud is the most frequently used predicate offense under RICO
because of its simplicity and flexibility. 139 Thus, this Comment will focus
exclusively on this crime as a framework for injured ERISA plan
participants or beneficiaries who seek redress for their injuries under
RICO. The elements of mail fraud are relatively simple to prove. It
requires a scheme to defraud, intent, and use of the mail in that
scheme. 140 Each separate mailing in furtherance of the scheme constitutes
a separate offense.141 Thus two fraudulent mailings can satisfy the
minimum of two or more predicate offenses required to establish a
pattern of racketeering activity. 14 However, mailings alone, especially if
they involve the same transaction, are unlikely to establish a pattern.1
43
The concept of a "scheme to defraud" under the mail fraud statute is
broad. During the 1970s and 1980s, the courts expanded the concept to
include not just deprivation of property from the victim and ill-gotten
gain by the perpetrator, but also deprivation of "intangible rights."'"
139. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 124, at 120.
140. The mail fraud statute provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises,. . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places
in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier,... shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
141. See Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391,394 (1916).
142. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 502 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. See, e.g., Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, 407 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding
mailings insufficient to establish continuity factor unless they contain misrepresentations themselves,
and court must look to underlying scheme to defraud); Anderson v. Foundation for Advancement,
Educ. and Employment of Am. Indians, 155 F.3d 500, 506 (4th Cir. 1998) ("We are especially
cautious when the acts involved are mail ... fraud: 'It will be the unusual fraud that does not enlist
the mails ... at least twice."') (citation omitted); Schultz v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank,
N.A., 94 F.3d 721, 731-32 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding continuity not established where very few acts of
mail fraud were alleged and only one scheme was alleged); Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant
Servs., Inc., 20 F.3d 771, 780-81 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding multiple mailings over short period fail to
satisfy continuity element).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 522 F.2d 641, 648 (2d Cir. 1975) (concluding that city
official defrauded citizens of honest services); United States v. Bryza, 522 F.2d 414, 422-23 (7th
Cir. 1975) (concluding that failure to disclose conflict of interest to employer violated mail fraud
statute); see also United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1982) (concerning scheme to defraud
union members of honest and faithful services). For a discussion of the development of the
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Although this judicial construction was overruled by the U.S. Supreme
Court in McNally v. United States, 4 Congress reinstated the "intangible
rights" doctrine."4 These "intangible rights" include the right of private
parties to expect honesty from one in a fiduciary relationship with
them. 4
7
To establish actionable fraud under the mail fraud statute, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with intent. 48 Intent generally means
that the defendant knew of the fraudulent nature of the scheme. 49
However, intent can also be proven by establishing that the defendant
acted with reckless disregard for the truth.'
Mail fraud requires use of the mail in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud."5' The mailing must be at least incidental to an essential part of
the scheme or a step in the plot.' If the mailings include fraudulent
misrepresentations, then each may be treated as a separate fraudulent
scheme, and the continuity prong of the pattern element is easily
established. If the mailings do not include misrepresentations, each
mailing may be actionable as an individual count of mail fraud."M
However, they may not form the pattern that RICO requires.155
"intangible rights doctrine " see generally Michael R. Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible
Rights: Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 181 (1988).
145. 483 U.S. 350,360(1987).
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994) (providing that "[flor the purposes of this chapter, the term
'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
to honest services").
147. See United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding bond trader
employee who knowingly established account for bogus firm in which he held interest deprived
employer of honest services).
148. See Laura A. Eilers & Harvey B. Silikovitz, Mail and Wire Fraud, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
703,712 (1994).
149. See id
150. See United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3d Cir. 1995).
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
152. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989) (holding mailings of title-
transfer paperwork in scheme to sell cars with bogus odometer readings sufficient for mail fraud).
153. See Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402,407 (1998).
154. See Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs. Co., 48 F.3d 1066, 1069-70 & n.6 (8th
Cir. 1995).
155. See Wisdom, 167 F.3d at 407 ("Though mail fraud can be a predicate act, mailings are
insufficient to establish the continuity factor unless they contain misrepresentations themselves. The
court must look to the underlying scheme to defraud."); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926
F.2d 1406, 1414 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[Ihe continuity question should not be affected by the fact that a
particular fraudulent scheme involved numerous otherwise 'innocent' mailings.').
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D. Civil RICO Cause ofAction
RICO allows for a private cause of action for any person injured in his
or her business or property by reason of a violation of the RICO criminal
provisions.56 It provides for treble damages and recovery of costs and
attorney's fees.'57 Courts in civil RICO actions are authorized to order
divestiture of an interest in an enterprise, restrict the future activities of
persons involved in the type of activity in which the enterprise was
engaged, or order dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.'58 To
prevail and recover in a civil RICO action, a private plaintiff must prove
each of the elements of the criminal RICO offense.'59 Plaintiffs must also
prove that they have standing to sue-that they have been injured in their
business or property and that the criminal offense was the cause of their
injury.160
1. Purpose and History of the Civil RICO Cause ofAction
Civil RICO has been used in ways that Congress may not have
intended.'16  Even though Congress intended RICO to rein in the
influence of organized criminal activity on and within legitimate
businesses, 62 the impact of civil RICO has been greatest on legitimate
businesses. 163 The legislative history of RICO indicates that Congress
added the civil cause of action as an additional tool both to provide a
remedy for those who had been injured by organized crime and to
discourage organized criminal activity."6 However, Congress did not
limit the scope of the criminal RICO provisions to membership in
organized crime. 65 Instead, it defined criminality under RICO on the
156. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1994).
159. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
161. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) ("[I]n its private civil version,
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the original conception of its enactors.").
162. See id. at 525-26 (Powell, J., dissenting).
163. See id. at499&n.16.
164. See id. at 487-88.
165. See Mark Stephen Poker, Reaching the Deep Pocket Under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 Marq. L. Rev. 511, 517 (1989).
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basis of conduct.'" Had Congress written the law to apply only to
members of traditional organized crime, RICO may have been subject to
constitutional challenge. 67 As a result, private plaintiffs have commonly
brought civil RICO actions against what are otherwise legitimate
businesses. 161
2. Civil RICO Has Had a Tumultuous History in the Courts
Because private litigants have used civil RICO in ways not foreseen
by Congress, courts have attempted to limit RICO's scope. 169 During the
1970s, civil RICO was seldom used by private litigants, but in the early
1980s the number of such suits skyrocketed.170 To contain the flood of
civil RICO litigation, some courts read additional requirements into the
statute:... first, a requirement that the defendant have a prior criminal
RICO conviction;' and second, a requirement that the plaintiff not
simply be injured by the predicate acts, but suffer a further "racketeering
injury" caused by the pattern of racketeering activity. 3 Other courts of
appeals disagreed. 74
The Supreme Court addressed this split in the circuits in Sedima
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.' After reviewing the language and legislative
history of § 1964(c), the Court held that no prior conviction was required
because there was no evidence that Congress intended such a
requirement.76 Further, the Court rejected the "racketeering injury"
requirement because RICO was intended to reach both legitimate and
illegitimate businesses and because racketeering activity was defined
166. See id
167. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 525 (Powell, J., dissenting).
168. See id at499n.16.
169. See, e.g., idat 499.
170. See idat481 n.1.
171. See id at 485-86 & n.6.
172. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 1984).
173. See, e.g., Sedima S.P.1LL. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S.
479 (1985).
174. See, e.g., Haroco v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 394, 398-99 (7th Cir.
1984) (holding no "racketeering injury" requirement); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc.,
689 F.2d 94, 95 & n.I (6th Cir. 1982) (finding no prior conviction required).
175. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
176. Seeid at493.
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broadly in the statute. 7 7 The Court held that the only injury required was
that flowing from the predicate acts themselves. l7  Finally, the Court
emphasized that RICO was intended to attack not only the "archetypal,
intimidating mobster," but also otherwise legitimate businesses that
engage in organized crime as RICO defines it-a pattern of racketeering
activity.
179
Civil RICO places a great deal of pressure on defendants.80 It has a
broad scope-the list of predicate "racketeering activity" offenses is
long, and many of the underlying predicate acts, such as mail fraud, are
sweeping themselves.' The potential for treble damages and attorney's
fees provides pressure.'82 Finally, a RICO judgment carries with it the
stigma of being branded a "racketeer."' 83 This combination results in
strong pressure on a defendant to settle a dispute and avoid not only
protracted litigation, but also the risk of tremendous financial exposure
and poor public relations."'4
3. Standing to Sue Under Civil RICO
Standing to sue under civil RICO requires two elements: (1) that the
plaintiff suffered an injury; and (2) that the defendant's racketeering
activity caused the injury.'85 Civil RICO requires that the plaintiff be
"injured in his business or property."' 86 The lower courts have generally
interpreted this term to require injury of a commercial nature to business
persons.'87 This construction is borrowed directly from the federal
177. See id. at 497-98.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. See G. Richard Strafer et al., Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 655, 657 (1982).
182. See Sedima, 473 U.S at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
183. See 1 Kathleen Brickey, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Treatise on the Criminal Liability
of Corporations, Their Officers and Agents § 7A:02, at 427 (1992) ("[A]dding a civil RICO count to
a complaint serves as a potent inducement for defendants to settle the case and avoid the stigma of
being publicly associated with nefarious 'racketeering activities.'") (footnote omitted).
184. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. See Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1095 (11th Cir. 1998).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
187. See Annette M. Sansone, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Personal Injuries in Civil
Action for Damages Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C.S.
§ 1964(c)), 96 A.L.R. Fed. 881, § 2 (1990).
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antitrust statutes that contain civil treble-damage provisions that long
predate those of RICO. 8 The courts have generally construed the term
"business or property" in that context to be a limitation on standing
excluding personal injuries.'89 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that it is not necessary for a plaintiff in a civil antitrust action to be a
business entity, only that the loss suffered be a loss to either "business"
or "property" as each term is independently understood. 9 ' Furthermore,
the Court in Sedima made clear that the restrictive standing requirements
found in antitrust jurisprudence are inappropriate in the civil RICO
context due to RICO's broader scope.' 9' Many courts have indicated a
willingness to consider loss of income or employment proximately
caused by racketeering activity as a RICO injury on the theory that an
individual's employment is his or her business. 92 At least one court has
also found the inability to enjoy one's property caused by an attempted
murder that resulted in a coma to be a RICO injury.'93
188. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
189. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979). An analysis of antitrust jurisprudence is
helpful in understanding the phrase. For a discussion of the relevance of antitrust doctrine to civil
RICO jurisprudence, see Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99 (majority opinion) and 510-20 (Marshall, 3.,
dissenting).
190. See Reiter, 442 U.S. at 337-41 (holding consumers had standing to sue for treble damages
under Clayton Act for higher prices charged to consumers caused by anticompetitive activity in
violation of antitrust laws).
191. SeeSedima, 473 U.S. at 498-99.
192. See, e.g., Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 437 n.4 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that allegations of
intimidation and harassment did not state RICO injury, but evidence of injury to business or property
"such as lost wages" as result of predicate acts could be sufficient); Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 353 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Schiffels' firing [was] probably an injury to her
'business.'"); Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 n.12 (3d Cir. 1991) ("This court
has held that the loss of employment due to racketeering activity is injury to 'business' and not
personal injury and so resulting loss of wages, benefits, and damage to reputation are compensable
under section 1964(c).); Snead v. Hygrade Food Prods. Assocs., No. Civ. A. 98-2657, 1998 WL
910223, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating that termination of employment may be injury to business or
property); Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F. Supp. 963, 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("If [decedents]
had been merely disabled by the attempt on their lives but survived, presumably they would have
had a RICO claim for lost earnings from their business activities because they had been injured in
their 'business or property.").
193. See Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 634 F. Supp. 1284, 1309 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[P]ermanent
unconsciousness deprives her of the ability to rearrange her affairs .... The inability to do so is a
financial injury to Mrs. von Bulow ... and her inability to enjoy her personal and real property may
well be compensable monetary injuries under RICO.").
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The second element of standing requires that the predicate acts of
racketeering caused the plaintiff's injury. 94 The RICO violation must be
both the "but for" cause and the proximate or "legal" cause of the
injury.'95 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the proximate cause issue in
Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.'96 In Holmes, a stock
manipulation scheme caused two broker-dealers to default on obligations
and required the Securities Investor Protection Corp. (SIPC), a nonprofit
corporation, to reimburse the broker-dealers' customers. 197 Court-
appointed trustees supervising the liquidation of the broker-dealers and
the SIPC sued under civil RICO.'98 The Court explained that the notion
"proximate cause" reflects "ideas of what justice demands, or of what is
administratively possible and convenient.""' In evaluating whether a
plaintiff has standing to make a RICO claim, the Court discussed four
factors: (1) whether others are positioned to make the same claims;
(2) whether the plaintiff would have difficulty showing that the damages
flowed from the defendant's conduct; (3) whether there was a risk of
double recovery; and (4) whether the defendant's conduct was
sufficiently harmful to warrant deterrence."0 Based on this evaluation,
the Court held that because the SIPC stood at too remote a distance from
the alleged fraud it had no standing to sue in its own right.20 1 However,
the case was remanded with the comment that the SIPC still had a
potential remedy because it could share appropriately in whatever
damages the trustees were able to recover in their suit.202
III. CIVIL RICO PROVIDES A POSSIBLE SOLUTION FOR
ERISA'S FAILURE
ERISA fails to deter fraudulent benefit denials and fails to protect
consumers adequately when benefits are denied by a plan administrator
and damage ensues that cannot be rectified by "equitable" remedies.
194. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994) ("Any person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor.) (emphasis added).
195. See Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331, 336 (4th Cir. 1996).
196. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
197. Seeid. at261.
198. Seeid. at263.
199. Id. at 268 (internal citation omitted).
200. See id. at 268-69.
201. Seeid. at 274.
202. See id.
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There is a widespread perception that plan administrators routinely deny
needed and deserved medical care for financial reasons." 3 State laws that
purport to grant plaintiffs a "right to sue" their medical plans are
preempted to the extent that they attempt to regulate self-funded ERISA
plans.2 At the federal level, Congress has been unwilling to reform
ERISA to provide relief.05 Several courts have wrung their hands in
frustration at their inability to provide relief for those injured and their
survivors through the mechanisms of ERISA alone.206
A. ERISA Fails to Deter Fraudulent Denials ofBenefits
ERISA offers little or no deterrence against administrators denying
legitimate benefits because it does not provide money damages.20 7
Equitable remedies may be adequate in the context of pension plans
where benefits that are denied can be provided after the fact. These
remedies were also adequate under the predominantly "fee for service"
health insurance model of the 1970s because benefit claims were
generally not scrutinized until after procedures were performed.2 '
However, the health insurance model has changed from "fee for service"
to "managed care" with prospective review features.2" Under this model,
administrators determine whether or not to grant benefits before the
procedure is performed.210 Thus, a wrongful denial of benefits can result
in a lost opportunity for care, with catastrophic results that cannot be
remedied equitably after the fact.2 ' Health benefits that are prescribed by
the attending physician as necessary, but which are denied or delayed by
the administrator as not covered under the terms of the plan, have caused
203. See infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
206. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); Corcoran
v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992).
207. See David S. Hilzenrath, At Stake in Senate Debate: HMOs' Shield Against Damage Suits,
Wash. Post, July 11, 1999, at A12 ("If the only thing health plans stand to lose in litigation is the
cost of the care they denied, 'they have every financial incentive to delay and delay and deny and
deny.'") (internal quotation omitted).
208. See Gonzales, supra note 80, at 723-24.
209. See itd at 727.
210. See Larry L Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry: An
Abdication ofJudicialLaw-CreatingAuthority, 46 Fla. L. Rev. 355,361-62 (1994).
211. See Higgins, supra note 88.
Washington Law Review
death-a result for which equity provides no remedy. 12 ERISA
precludes any type of restitution that amounts to "money damages." '
Thus, a participant's only option under ERISA in such a case is to sue for
an injunction during the critical time immediately following the benefit
denial.21 4
B. Fraudulent Denial ofBenefits Is the "Regular Way ofDoing
Business "
A public perception of widespread abuse by insurers and adminis-
trators stems from the liability exemption that ERISA affords managed-
care organizations (MCOs). 2"5 Although it is difficult to prove
statistically that coverage decisions are made for purely financial
reasons, it appears to the public that these entities are driven primarily by
their bottom lines.216 There is also objective evidence of abuse. In 1998, a
training videotape surfaced during discovery in a lawsuit against Aetna, a
large insurer and benefit administrator.2 17 In the tape, Aetna lawyers
teach claims managers to treat claims made under policies sold to ERISA
plans differently from claims made under non-ERISA policies." 8 The
tape implies that the claims administrator can deny ERISA plan claims
with impunity because ERISA removes the threat of a lawsuit.
21 9
212. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 1998)
(concerning participant's death when bone marrow transplant approval came too late); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (concerning fetal death when hospital stay for
high-risk pregnancy was denied).
213. See, e.g., Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1339 (holding emotional distress damages not available to
mother of dead fetus).
214. See Bast, 150 F.3d at 1010 n.1.
215. See Miller, supra note 60, at 7B.
216. See id.; see also Donald W. Light, Life, Death, and the Insurance Companies, 330 New Eng.
J. Med. 498, 498 (1994).
217. See Aetna Video Fuels Renewed HMO Fight, San Diego Union-Trib., Oct. 13, 1998, at A6.
The tape concerned disability insurance benefits, but the company indicated their policies are no
different for health insurance benefits. See id.
218. See id.
219. Note the following from a recent newspaper article:
If the patient is in an ERISA plan and therefore can't sue, then his claims simply can be denied
by a claims agent. It's up to the patient to challenge the denial. And Aetna decides when the
appeals process is over. "After we send the final letter, it doesn't matter what they send us any
more," says one of the [Aetna] lawyers.
Patients 'Right to Sue Needed Check on Health Care Industry, USA Today, Oct. 19, 1998, at 26A.
336
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To date, the means available to provide relief to plaintiffs injured by
the fraudulent denial of necessary medical care have been ineffective.
Where possible, in keeping with the Travelers decision, courts have
characterized administrative coverage decisions as medical malpractice
to allow state remedies." However, this is a viable option only where
the administrator exercises enough control over the providers of care to
establish vicarious liability.2" State laws that allow patients to sue their
medical plans are, at best, effective only against insured plans, m and
more and more employers are choosing to self-fund.' Congress refuses
to enact meaningful reform of ERISA that allows injured plaintiffs the
full remedies they deserve. 4
C. Civil RICO May Provide a Remedy for ERISA Violations
A broad reading of civil RICO and an examination of its historical use
in the ERISA context illustrate that RICO may provide an alternative
remedy to victims of ERISA violations. Courts that have addressed the
lack of remedies for damages caused by ERISA plan administrators have
indicated that the possibility of relief lies only in changing ERISA
itself.' However, civil RICO plaintiffs can recover treble damages for
their injuries, costs, and attorney's fees if they can establish that (1) a
person employed by or associated with an enterprise conducted or
participated in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity, and (2) the conduct proximately caused injuries to
the plaintiff's business or property. 6 Although this remedy may or may
not be adequate to compensate for all injuries, it provides a powerful
incentive for benefit administrators to treat claims of ERISA plan
participants with the same care as they treat those not covered by ERISA.
RICO exempts neither ERISA plans nor those who violate ERISA
from its scope. Both case law and congressional intent demonstrate that
220. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text
225. See, e.g., Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 150 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998); Corcoran
V. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1339 (5th Cir. 1992).
226. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
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RICO is an appropriate avenue of relief for ERISA violations. Predicate
offenses within RICO include several that relate specifically to ERISA
plans.227 Civil RICO is a weapon used by insurers and administrators of
ERISA plans themselves to combat fraud and abuse by participants and
providers.228
While numerous cases refer to ERISA as the "exclusive" source of
remedies for violations of ERISA, exclusivity is always cited in the
context of preemption of state laws, rather than other federal laws.229
Enforcement of other federal laws does not frustrate the intent of ERISA
because the purpose of ERISA is to provide for a uniform federal
enforcement system, and giving full effect to other federal laws such as
RICO does not subject employers to a patchwork of regulation.20
Patients have used civil RICO to obtain a remedy when their health
plan defrauded them. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc."' involved insured
patients' challenge of fraudulent MCO billing activity through civil
RICO.232 In Forsyth, an MCO failure to disclose secret discounts
negotiated between the MCO and providers resulted in higher co-
payments charged to patients than what their managed-care agreements
stipulated.233 The district court held that the patients' RICO claim was
improper because the harsh penalties of RICO would "invalidate, impair,
or otherwise supersede" state law" as proscribed by the McCarren-
Ferguson Act. 5 The plaintiffs' only available remedy thus became
ERISA restitution. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed thedistrict court and remanded, holding that federal RICO is not barred by
227. RICO defines "racketeering activity" to include "any act which is indictable under... title
18, United States Code ... section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare
funds)... [and] section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments) ... " 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(l)(B) (1994).
228. See Steven P. Del Mauro, Health Insurance Fraud: Fighting Back, The Brief, Winter 1997,
at 10, 14.
229. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 104-05 (1983) (holding federal
nondiscrimination statutes and regulations not preempted).
230. See id.
231. 827 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Nev. 1993), rev'd, 114 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997), aff'd, 119 S.
Ct. 710 (1999).
232. See id. at 1501.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 1521.
235. The McCarren-Ferguson Act establishes that insurance is primarily an area left to the states.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994).
236. See Forsyth, 827 F. Supp. at 1508-09.
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the McCarren-Ferguson Act, so that both the RICO claim and the ERISA
claim already approved by the district court could go forward. 7 The
U.S. Supreme Court aftirmed.23 8
Congressional intent also supports a RICO cause of action for ERISA
violations. Congress has acted where it has determined that RICO is aninappropriate supplement to other federal remedial schemes. 2 9 In 1995,
in response to the flood of RICO litigation over securities law violations,
Congress amended § 1964(c) to prohibit civil RICO actions with respect
to securities fraud, including the use of mail and wire fraud in a securities
context, unless there had been a prior criminal conviction.2' The
justification was that ample remedies already existed in the securities
laws.24' There is no such impediment with respect to ERISA violations.
D. How to Establish a RICO Claim for Fraudulent Benefit Denials
To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must establish standing to sue
and prove that the actions of the benefit administrator amounted to a
RICO violation.242 The latter involves proving the underlying predicate
acts and the elements of RICO itself.243 The former involves proving
causation and establishing that the injury the plaintiff suffered was to his
or her business or property.2'
1. The Person
When a participant in a self-insured ERISA medical plan is injured
because benefits and treatment are delayed or denied due to fraud on the
part of the administrator, the defendant-the RICO "person"--will
typically be the third-party administrator or insurance company that
administers the claims for the employer's plan. The administrator is a
plan "fiduciary" under ERISA to the extent that the administrator
237. Forsyth v. Humana, Inc. 114 F.3d 1467, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that district court's
ERISA holding as to co-payors' claims was not appealed), afid, 119 S. Ct. 710 (1999).
238. See Humana, Inc., v. Forsyth, 119 S.Ct. 710,719 (1999).
239. See Abrams & Beale, supra note 124, at 77-78 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
240. See iii
241. See id
242. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 113-38 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 185-202 and accompanying text.
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exercises any discretionary authority or responsibility in plan
administration, that is, claims adjudication.245 As a fiduciary, the
administrator owes the participants a duty to act in the participants' best
interest.46
2. The Enterprise
The "enterprise" may either be the ERISA plan itself or the employer
who provided the benefit, as both entities clearly meet the loose
definition of "enterprise" in § 1961(4).47 In either case, the defendant
and the enterprise are separate entities as required by judicial
construction of § 1962.248 The defendant participates directly not only in
the affairs of the ERISA plan, but also in the affairs of the employer, via
the employer's medical plan.
Even though pleading the required nexus between the enterprise and
interstate or foreign commerce in this scenario would not typically be a
problem, it must be alleged in the complaint.249 Almost any business that
self-funds its medical plan, as well as any third-party administrator, will
be engaged in interstate commerce on some level, and a minimal level is
all that is required.50
3. Proving the Pattern ofRacketeering Activity
In establishing a RICO violation, the threshold barrier is alleging
multiple predicate acts that form a pattern. Using mail fraud as the
predicate acts requires at least two mailings improperly denying benefits
to the same victim and would be the simplest way to establish the
"relatedness" prong. Mailings used to communicate the fraudulent denial
of benefits are more than merely incidental to the fraud; they are
necessary to the scheme.
245. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text; see also Libby-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) ("When an insurance
company administers claims for an employee welfare benefit plan and has the authority to grant or
deny the claims, the company is an ERISA 'fiduciary."').
246. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
250. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Though most of America apparently believes that denial of legitimate
benefits by insurers and administrators is a regular way of doing
business,"' proving the "continuity" prong of the "pattern" element will
likely be the most difficult hurdle for plaintiffs in establishing a violation
of § 1962(c). The particular predicate acts perpetrated against any one
victim are not likely to extend over a period of one year. It is also
unlikely that any one defendant will be the victim of more than one
scheme. A victim will probably need to prove that the fraudulent denial
of claims is an administrator's regular way of doing business. This may
involve finding other victims of similar denials, or establishing, through
serendipitous discoveries like the Aetna videotape or the testimony of
whistleblowers, that administrators routinely denied claims when they
knew or should have known that the claim should be approved.
4. Establishing Standing
Prolonged illness or death is an injury to both the victim's business
and property because an employee's continued employment is that
employee's business. 2 Medical benefits are offered to employees as a
part of their overall compensation package, negotiated in a commercial
setting. Because the right to enjoy one's property is a fundamental
property interest, an employee's business and property is injured when
the employee can no longer work and earn a salary due to an accident or
illness and an agent of the employer denies health benefits rightfully due
under a compensation arrangement with the employer. 3
Even though the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of
whether such an injury should be characterized as a personal injury, the
majority of lower courts have held that personal injuries are not
cognizable under RICO.' The cases that have so held have generally
followed the analogous antitrust case law"5 and the presumption that
Congress does not intend to supplant state jurisdiction unless it does so
251. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
254. See Sansone, supra note 187, § 3.
255. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 UJ.S. 330, 339 (1979) (commenting in dictum that "[t]he
phrase 'business or property' also retains restrictive significance... [and] would, for example,
exclude personal injuries suffered").
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explicitly." 6 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly warned
that RICO standing should not be bound by antitrust jurisprudence." 7
The Court said that relying on antitrust concepts "could create
inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of... a private
litigant [who] would have to contend with a body of precedent-
appropriate in a purely antitrust context-setting strict requirements on
questions such as 'standing to sue' and 'proximate cause.' , 2 1
The fact that plaintiffs are left without any other remedy under ERISA
weighs heavily in favor of a more liberal standing requirement. Courts
have not ruled on this civil RICO standing issue in the ERISA context,
259
but in other contexts those courts that have found no standing for RICO
plaintiffs with personal injuries have uniformly done so based on the
belief that adequate remedies existed in state law.2 ° In the context of
ERISA, that justification is improper. Because Congress has expressly
preempted state-law causes of action related to administrative benefit
denials under an ERISA plan261' and has expressly intended that RICO be
broadly construed to effectuate its remedial purposes,262 an exception to
the civil RICO standing requirement should be carved out for personal
injuries caused by a pattern of racketeering activity within the ERISA
context.
Based on the four factors used to evaluate proximate cause in Holmes
v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., plaintiffs injured by fraudulent
256. See New York State Conference. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 654-55 (1995).
257. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985).
258. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
259. A search of federal cases dealing with a RICO claim alleging personal injuries in the denial
of benefits under an ERISA plan has yielded no results.
260. See, e.g., Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Ample law
already existed to provide recovery for wrongfully inflicted personal injuries .... We discern no
injustice in limiting a RICO plaintiff's recovery for his personal injuries to ordinary non-RICO legal
measures."); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 848 n.9 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Appellants of course have a
remedy in a state law action based on wrongful death . .
261. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
262. The U.S. Supreme Court has said:
RICO is to be read broadly. This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously expansive
language and overall approach, but also of its express admonition that RICO is to 'be liberally
construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.' The statute's 'remedial purposes' are nowhere
more evident than in the provision of a private action for those injured by racketeering activity.
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498 (citations omitted).
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claim denials should have standing.263 Others are not in a position to
make the same claims, and the damages clearly flow from the
defendant's conduct. There is no risk of double recovery because the
plaintiff has no remedy under ERISA, and state-law causes of action are
preempted. Fraudulent denial of medical claims and the resultant lack of
necessary treatment certainly warrant deterrence.
If a plaintiff injured by a fraudulent denial of care can overcome the
substantial hurdle of establishing the elements of a RICO violation-
most notably the "pattern" element, the fact that the business or property
injuries flow from a personal injury should not deny them standing to sue
and recover civil RICO penalties.
IV. CONCLUSION
Judicial interpretation of ERISA's preemption of state tort and
contract actions has evolved since ERISA's enactment in 1974. Today,
with the advent of integrated delivery systems where the line between
benefit administration and provision of care has been blurred, private
plaintiffs who are participants in MCOs have a better chance than ever of
overcoming ERISA preemption. Courts are more willing to allow claims
for denial of care to be characterized as medical malpractice and are
more likely to allow such state law claims to go forward. However, two
trends are alarming. First, MCOs are retreating behind the shield of
ERISA preemption by distancing themselves from the providers of care,
making it more difficult to characterize their decisions as medical
malpractice. Second, employers are increasingly choosing to self-fund
rather than insure, thereby avoiding state regulation. The prospect of
ERISA's amendment is dim, and those participants, like Rhonda Bast,
who find themselves the victims of purely administrative decisions of
self-funded plan administrators still have no meaningful remedy.
Proving all the required elements of a civil RICO violation will be
difficult for many plaintiffs. Judgments awarded to successful plaintiffs
may be somewhat smaller than those awarded in state malpractice or
wrongful death actions and may not be as satisfying for ERISA plan
participants like Rhonda Bast and her survivors" who became victims of
263. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 505 U.S. 258,268-69 (1992).
264. Whether the survivors of a deceased victim have standing to sue will be a question of the
underlying state law. A plaintiff in a civil RICO action based on wrongful denial of ERISA benefits
may have to initiate the suit before the plaintiff dies. A complete discussion of this issue is beyond
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the administrative decisions of self-funded plan administrators.
Nonetheless, the civil RICO solution is a worthwhile and compelling
avenue because the threat of branding otherwise legitimate business
organizations with the "racketeer" and "corrupt" labels may provide the
sort of deterrence so sorely lacking in the ERISA regulatory scheme.
the scope of this Comment, but in Jerry Kubecka, Inc. v. Avellino, 898 F. Supp. 963, 969 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), the personal representative of the deceased did not have standing to sue under § 1964(c)
because under the New York wrongful-death statute the personal representative did not step into the
shoes of the decedent and therefore was not "injured in his business or property." However, if the
injured plaintiff initiates a civil RICO action, the lawsuit should survive the death of the plaintiff.
See Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513, 518 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding civil RICO remedial, not
punitive, so actions survive death of plaintiff).
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